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Interviewee: Major General Edward Lansdale 
Date: 25 April 1971 
Q: Gen Lansdale, would you tell us how you first b e came 
involved in military affairs? What was your direc tion 
that brought you into the Army, and what were you doing when 
you first joined the Army? 
A: I was in an advertising agency in San Francisco when 
World War II started. I was really past the age of being 
drafted, and especially since I had children, and both 
status and age were keeping me out. But, I wanted to do 
something to help the country in the war, I tried to get 
involved in some type of service, I started off initially 
with the Office of Strategic Services as an intelligence 
collector for them, and after working at that for a time, 
I was picked up also by the Military Intelligence Service 
of the U. S. Army. For a time after as a civilian during 
the war, I was working for both O.S.S. and M.I.S. I was 
told at one time by Wild Bill Donovan, who was head of 
the O.S.S., that I was the only individual so employed by 
both services at the same time. There was an amount of 
rivalry between them. But in 1943, the M.I.S. wanted me to 
spend most of my time serving them so I was commissioned 
as a first lieutenant. I'd been a reserve officer year s 
before, out of college ROTC, but had resigned. They picked 
up my old commission finally in 1943 and renewed it as a 
first lie utenant. From then on I was servi ng for M.I.S. 
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Q: What was the nature of the intelligence community when 
you first got involved with it? Was it sort of a makeshift 
operation or had they really had firm plans for how they 
were going to gather their intelligence? 
A: Well they had many plans of course on how they were 
to gather intelligence, but I don't think the United States 
was really ready for a global conflict such as World War II 
and the needs of the conflict in the way of very basic 
information in geography terrain maps, man-made features on 
the terrain, the people involved, the vast and hitherto 
h 
almost unknown places were we were putting forces. This put 
' 
a tremendous demand on the United States to come up with 
information to be used by top headquarters and in theater 
commands. Part of the work was almost like being an editor 
of the National Geographic Magazine in that we collected 
photographs of not only airstrips and beaches for landings 
but also roads and bridges and more pedestrian types of 
geographic information. We also went into details on people 
who lived in places, their potentials for helping our 
troops, potentials for collecting information about Japanese, 
about Germans, and so on. 
Q: This information gathering, did you just start with one 
piece of information and then say, we could use a little 
more about this area, and just start growing and growing as 
you became more involved and discovered that there were 
things you could find out that would be useful? 
A: There were known gaps in information. All of the 
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intelligence services of the military and the O.S.S. at the 
time had priorities on what they needed to know. Then they 
would list the gaps of the information by countries and by 
subject areas so that in effect, there was a very large 
gazette listing unknown but desired information. We would 
try to get this information from people. I interviewed folks 
who had been in foreign areas, such as scientists, geologists, 
ichthyologists, and others. We would sort of mentally take 
them through their experiences in these countries to not only 
cover their own subject areas, but also tell us about the 
people they knew and the conditions as they were when last 
seen and so on. For example, one of them was a person like 
Bailey Willis, who was the professor emeritus of geology at 
Stanford University. He was the only American we knew who 
had been in Okinawa when the Japanese were holding it as a 
mandate. He had talked the Japanese Imperial Navy into 
letting him go there as a geologist just before World War II 
started. He had walked through the territory and knew it. 
Well a person such as Willis would just be invaluable, 
not only to describe the terrain, but also to say whether 
the Japs had done this or that. Did you see any defenses? 
What are the harbors like? The beaches? Would the people 
be going along with the Japanese or would they resist if 
given the chance? Many questions immediately spring to 
mind, so that in talking with a person such as that, you'd 
have a map out and be filling in any details that you didn't 
have. You'd have your aerial photos and be doing, in effect, 
photo interpretation: What the hell is that square thing 
there or the squiggly thing or whatever? He'd usually know 
and fill you in on the details. Aside from that, given the 
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nature of the conflict, you'd say, where else have you been? 
And then you'd quickly discover that a person such as that 
had been up in the Sing Ling Shan Mountains of China, had 
done surveys in many other places. One thing I picked up 
information for the Navy from Bailey Willis not only about 
the Pacific Ocean, the Pacific Basin which he knew very 
well, but places like the Sargasso Sea. He had many clues 
that would help locate submarine refueling spots in the 
ocean that could be passed very quickly to the Office of 
Naval Intelligence. Each individual, in effect, was a gold 
mine if the interviewer was a good miner and knew how to 
go after such things. 
Q: During World War II you had occasion to visit with 
tribal groups on occasion. Would you describe how this 
came about and the effect. 
A: The Indonesians, the Sumatrans from Indonesia, were 
the sailors of Indonesia and had gone aboard Dutch ships 
which were helping the Allied effort in all oceans, 
particularly their merchant ships, transports, freighters, 
to back up our war effort. The Office of Naval Intelligence 
and the British at one point got word that the Indonesian 
seamen aboard these Dutch ships had heard Queen Wilhelmina's 
broadcast of her support of the Declaration of the Four 
Freedoms by Roosevelt and Churchill. Hearing this, they 
decided that they too were part of the four freedoms and 
they were all going to quit and go home and have their own 
freedom in Indonesia. This was at the time the Japanese 
were just coming down into Indonesia and proclaiming it 
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independent and forcing Indonesia into their Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Navy didn't have enough 
exact information on how many of the sailors were ready to 
strike, to desert, and so on. I was asked to help in this 
since I seemed to get along very well with Asians in the 
work that I had done. I managed to meet various of the 
Indonesian seamen in port and I had drinking bouts with 
them and at one of these I was rather exuberantly made a 
member of the Batok tribe of Sumatra. The Batoks, among 
the seamen, from then on kept me very well advised on what 
their plans were and also listened to me as I talked them 
out of having a strike and to continue on in the war 
effort until the day of victory when they could realize 
the four freedoms at that time. This type of working with 
tribes also extended to various European groups. I 
remember that I got in with a number of Andalusian 
emigrants who were against the Axis tie-in with Franco and 
who were willing to help the Allied effort. Also any 
place abroad where there were Andalusians, I got into 
correspondance with them to he •lp our effort. Perhaps 
these Andalusians had been sheep-herders at home, but as 
they left home and went abroad they became laborers or 
menials in households. We suddenly had a whole group of 
chauffeurs and house boys and gardeners situated next 
to very significant and prominent leaders of various nations, 
such as ambassadors and consul generals and so forth around 
the world, whose households were suddenly no longer safe for 
secrets. This made a considerable network at the time. 
This was years ago and I forget what all I was doing a nd 
what networks I set up. I would do the original rec r uiting 
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and setting them up but I wouldn't run them too much. They 
kept using me to go out getting new information and meet new 
people all the time, which seemed to be my forte. 
Q: Yau said you had contacts with the agents. Is there 
any reason, do you think, looking back, why you were able 
to communicate or be effective with the agents? 
A: I don't know what it was, except that to me people 
have always been people, and an individual has always been 
an individual regardless of the color of his skin or his 
race or his language. 
I have puzzled about this a great deal in my life, 
Asians have told me that I had alwayE dealt with and had 
given them their dignity when I dealt with them. They said 
that it was rare that a person would see them as real human 
beings. To me there has never been anything else but that. 
I grew up in California, in a place where the Asians 
were a minority that had a very rough time. And I presume 
not having joined in with the majority's denigration of the 
minority, and having known a number of Japanese and Philippinos 
when I was in school, along with Mexicans and all the rest 
of the minority groups in California, and still treating 
them as individuals, this helped. 
But I don't know what it is, I really don't. 
Q: Are you linguistically able to. 
A: No, not at all. I have a very bad ear for languages, 
and I have a very bad tongue for them. But having spent 
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many years among foreign people who don't know English and 
only picking up a few rudiments of a foreign language, I've 
had to depend a great deal on a look of empathy, a physical 
look, and an ability to try to communicate without words --
acting out things, and somehow or other getting the touch 
of one human being with another. I don't know what you 
would call it, but people respond to smiles, to an interest 
in their well being, even if you can't speak their way. If 
you've got a look that somehow or other they can read, why 
you can communicate with them. 
I remember once in the Philippines I spent hours with 
a Negrito, who was the president of a tribe living just 
beyond the bombing range on Clark Air Force Base. This was 
in 1945, just at the end of the war, I was trying to find 
out what had happened to the remnants of a Japanese armored 
column that had gone up in the hills. This president with 
some of his tribal men showed up at my camp. I cooked them 
up a dinner. His one word of English was Okay, and I knew 
two or three words from a little handbook I had of Tagalog. 
But, he didn't know Tagalog. So we had a time in trying to 
talk to each other. This problem was finally solved by each 
of us drawing pictures in the sand and by acting out parts. 
I finally gathered that Americans had done something to his 
daughter, and very specifically he showed me that the Americans 
had done it to his daughter's belly. So I figured that some 
GI had wondered up there, (and mind you, the Negritos are 
only about 3 to 4 feet high, pygmies), some GI must have 
really been hungry for a girl, and had done whatever had 
happened to his daughter. But after three or four hours 
of talk he started shaking his head, that his daughter 
wasn't pregnant, and this wasn't the trouble, there was 
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something else. Finally, after hours of laboriously trying 
to communicate, I discovered that Americans had set up 155 
artillery, and had been killing this Japanese armored 
column that was going to get up into the Zamrales range and 
get away from the 155s. He had been caught up in the draw 
there, and his daughter had been out getting vegetables, and 
a 155 went right through her belly, and she had been killed. 
With that I took off my GI watch that I had, and I strapped 
it on the wrist of the tribal president, as an expression of 
an American's sympathy about his daughter. He seemed pleased. 
I showed him how to wind the watch and how to listen to 
it. He didn't know how to tell time, but I showed him, and 
every time the sun went down he would wind the watch each 
day, so it would run for 24 hours. 
still has the watch up there. 
I have a hunch that he 
I went up some years afterwards to the range, during 
the Huk Campaign. 
I could never find the same particular group, the same 
tribal group. But I ran across others, and they had all 
heard about this watch. It was all over the mountain range 
about this American who had given the watch to the person 
whose daughter had been killed by the artillery. This is, 
I presume , an art of communication. 
At times I have had Americans or others with me as 
interpreters who were almost bilingual, or at least were 
rated excellent from a language school, and yet their empathy 
was flat. Some of them had picked up the manners of 
instructors or others, an outward show of superiority 
towards "natives". They were able to use the language far 
more readily than I ever was, and yet their manner caused 
people to freeze up. They lacked friendliness or something. 
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This quality would almost immediately be felt by these 
people who would react by becoming ultra cautious or 
circumspect in what they said. 
I recall another case. Around 1 66 or '67, I was up 
near Danang taking a look at the Marine Corps pacification 
campaign in Vietnam -- a very excellent campaign that they 
were doing. 
I accompanied one of the Marine Corps generals who 
invited me to go through a village with him. He had his 
staff along, and walking through the village, the Marines 
followed their handbook on this very same point of communicating 
with the natives. In parade ground voices they would shout 
"chao ong," which means hello. 
The villagers would be looking out of the doors and 
windows of the doors and windows of their huts. I'm sure 
the Marines didn't realize what "big" voices they had to the 
ears of the villagers. In turn you could just see the villagers 
taking in their breath to shout that same word back to these 
Marines, figuring that shouting must b.e an American habit. 
There was communication going on, but on seeing the 
villagers breathing in deeply in order to be able to yell 
back, the situation tickled my funnybone. I got to grinning. 
Seeing me finding this situation as funny as apparently 
they did too, they started grinning back at me. Then some 
came out of their houses and started walking along with me 
to watch other villagers in the street take in big breaths 
for the exchange of shouted hellos with the Marines. As 
with most simple comedy, the repetition got funnier as we 
walked along. 
Finally we got to the end of the village. The Marine 
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Corps general looked around, and here I was with all the 
villagers, and we were all laughing, and walking along, 
and he said, "How did you do it?" I asked, "How did I 
do what?" He said, "You haven't spoken a single word, and 
yet you've got all the villagers with you. Something is 
funny -- what are you laughing at?" And I said, "I 
really don't want to tell you . We just found something 
funny here among ourselves, and this is the way we speak 
or communicate with each other." 
Whatever it is, it's a quality of seizing a moment of 
life, maybe, and sharing it with people. It's seeing 
them as humans, and I couldn't have done it in this 
particular case, which I hadn't thought about at all, 
unless I had seen them as being hun,an and having a sense 
of humor, the whole bit -- sharing just a moment of fun 
with them. 
Q: Could you tell us something about the Japanese 
occupation of the Philippines, and how you became involved 
in the program? 
A: I went into the Philippines actually as an intelligence 
officer for the invasion of Japan. I got in right at the 
end of the liberation of the Philippines -- they were 
finishing up that campaign and starting to get ready for 
the main Japanese islands. 
The war ended. I found that I had considerable free 
time on my hands. I was a major at the time, and nobody 
quite knew what to do with me. I managed to find myself a 
jeep, and I took off and started driving around, (there 
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are some very beautiful places in the Philippines) and 
seeing what was going on, once in a while helping out as 
there would be a small Japanese unit still running around 
up in the boondocks, joining in with the infantry, ours 
and the local Filipinos, trying to locate these guys, and 
either get them to surrender, or often we didn't ask them 
to surrender, we just took care of them on the spot. 
Then I was assigned to the G-2 staff of AFWESPAC 
(Armed Forces, Western Pacific), where I formed a "positive 
intelligence" staff section for the G-2 -- Col Bishop at 
the time -- that would collect current information about 
the conditions in the command's area of responsibility, 
particularly the Philippines. My staff section was called 
the Intelligence Division. 
Later I carried out explorations of the Ryukyus 
islands north of Okinawa, at war's end, gathering current 
information for use by military government or whatever 
custodianship might be set up for that remote area. 
I commandeered a small Japanese fishing boat in Okinawa, 
with its crew. Then, with three enlisted men and myself 
aboard, we went all through the northern Ryukyus, visiting 
each island. I talked to the people and learned of the 
conditions there -- the condition of crops, the living 
conditions of the people, harbors, about landing places, 
roads and how the Japanese military were getting out at 
the time, and what we might have to contend with as a 
military government eventually. 
The AFWESPAC area was large. I didn't get down to 
Indonesia at the time, or down to New Guinea at all, but 
I did manage to get to many of the islands in the Philippines. 
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Mind you, there are 7000 islands there, and it kept me 
very busy getting around places. 
I'd go by air and sea and overland, and I got to know 
the Philippines quite well. 
I had discovered the many bands of dissidents on the 
island of which the Huks were only one. There were large 
bandit groups at the time who picked up weapons on the 
battle field or had weapons and had discovered a far easier 
way to make a living with a gun than having to work for it. 
Finally we did a survey, I had my staff do a survey, of 
conditions throughout the Philippines that wound up in 
about 14 compendium type of reports to the U.S. government. 
They told of conditions, economic and social and law and 
order or security type conditions throughout the Philippines. 
In 1946 as the Philippines was trying to figure out how 
they were going to be able to handle independance, my 
reports were just being completed by my staff and myself. 
I asked permission of the U.S. government to let me give 
them to the Philippine government, which they did. These 
reports became the subject of Philippine cabinet deliberation 
and also were used as sort of starting studies by the U.S. 
War Damage Commission and many other U.S. groups that were 
starting up economic aid and other help to the Philippines, 
at the end of the war. 
Q: Sir, from your observations, what was the Japanese 
Occupation like? It seemed like initially the greater 
Southeast Asian CO-Prosperity spirit might have been a 
very popular thing with some of the Asian people. 
A: It was a popular thing for the ambitious Asians which 
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the Japanese were very much aware of and would exploit 
be getting close to the more ambitious political figures 
in Asia, the Philippines and elsewhere and giving them 
a chance to be president or cabinet minister or to advance 
politically. This of course was very gratifying to the 
Asians to be given that chance. Then in the Philippines 
a rather unique thing happened. In trying to find out what 
it was, and this incidentally is in my book, the Philippine 
politicians that I talked to and the Philippine resistance 
leaders who were friends of mine were frequently put on 
the spot by me in trying to find out why they behaved 
differently at a moment when the United States had been 
defeated in the Philippines. They were left on their own, 
the Japanese were in their midst, with a very alluring 
promise of "you can go it on your own". Whether they were 
believed or not would be a factor. Whether there were any 
feelings of loyalty to the United States was a factor and 
so on. I tried very hard. Why was there so much resistance 
in the Philippines to the Japanese? Almost all of them 
told me a story and I don't know whether it's a true story 
or not, but I take it as the truth because the Filipinos 
believed it to the point of risking their lives in the 
belief that it was true. They all told me, and I heard 
this from many different sources, about an incident in the 
last days of Corregidor, before President Quezon and 
General MacArthur left Corregidor and went down to 
Australia, in the days when things looked very bleak. 
(The U.S. forces in Luzon had been driven back into Bataan 
and onto Corregidor, the Japanese had put their armed forces 
throughout the islands and had taken all of the main cities 
•' 
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and all of the main harbors and ports and so forth.) 
Quezon used the Corregidor radio to radio to send a 
message to President Roosevelt. Quezon pointed out that 
they had had an honorable agreement getween the Philippine 
Commonwealth and the U.S., a pact of common defense, in 
which they would be side by side against a common enemy. 
But the common enemy, the Japanese, had invaded the 
Philippines, were occupying most of it, and had, through 
bombing, artillery, and infantry brought great desolation 
to the Philippines. The people were under the guns and 
bayonets of an enemy. Quezon, as President of the Common-
wealth , felt that the time had come when he had to make a 
decision about continuing on with the agreement with the 
U.S. to defend the Philippines. He said that if he 
continued it, it would only bring increasing suffering to 
his people. Reluctantly, as the leader of his people, he 
felt that he should ask now to be relieved of h i s promise 
to continue fighting with the Americans, now that the 
battle was practically over and they had lost. I've never 
seen the message back from the White House, but it's 
gospel truth to all the Filipinos who then risked their 
lives after that. They said a message came back, signed 
by Roosevelt, that said that we understood the conditions 
in the Philippines and we Americans also didn't want the 
Filipinos to suf fer the consequences of the defense of that 
country; however, we Americans had promised to d e fend the 
Philippines and as long as one American was left alive, 
we were going to stick with our promise. We would try to 
do our best to help them and wouldn't go back on our promise 
but Quezon was free to do what he wanted. 
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Well, the Filipinos are very sentimental and emotional. 
Word of this, that the Americans as long as one American 
was left alive, would be true to their word, would still 
try to defend and help the Philippines, got out throughout 
the Philippine islands. When the Filipinos heard this, 
they thought, "Well, think of the shame if we stop ourselves 
now! Here are people who really aren't of us, but are 
dying while trying to defend us. They're sticking to 
their word, so we've got to keep going too." And this 
was what they tried to do in the war. The occupation of 
the Philippines by the Japanese had to change its character 
because of this. The Japanese were plagued from then on 
with guerrilla raids, by insurrections, by all sorts of 
troubles, sabotage continuously, slowdowns from work and 
all types of things that are very hard to put a finger on 
but which made Japanese tenure in the islands most difficult. 
I say it was a unique thing because the same type of thing 
didn't happen in any of the other places the Japanese 
occupied . They got along much better .with many other people 
than they ever did in the Philippines. They had a very 
difficult and continuing task during the entire war in 
keeping the Philippines pacified enough for them to carry 
out their military work there. This was mostly as a support 
base for vari ous operations further on. They had naval 
bases there, air bases , supply dumps, and what not. The 
Japanese, all during the occupation of the Philippines, 
had a rough time of it. Their political police -- the 
Kempetai -- devised methods of population control. One 
was a ''neighborhood association" in which people were 
supposed to inform on neighbors, with penalties for not 
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doing so, and with leading citizens being held responsible 
sort of as hostages to the state. Not too unlike the 
totalitarian measures of Nazi occupation in Europe. 
But none of this was really successful during the 
war, because the population largely remained loyal to 
Americans and to the Filipinos who were resisting the 
Japanese (as the friends of the Americans in this war.) 
Q: Sir, Emilio Aguinaldo became in the eyes of some a 
collaborator, although he claims that he was doing it to 
modify the effects of occupation. What is your feeling 
about his role during the Second World War and the occupation? 
A: He, and a number of others who were accused of behavior 
in precisely the same manner, and who were prominent 
Filipinos, I believe actually took risks to help, at least 
in their own minds. I think they would lie in bed at 
night worrying about whether they would live through the 
next day or not, and in their own mind they were really 
trying to help, I believe them on that. Some of these 
leaders actually were helping to get supplies to the 
guerrillas who were fighting the Japanese, were helping to 
hide information from the Japanese, were hiding individuals 
who were escaping from the Japanese, and were risking 
their lives to do so. 
Now one of these became President afterwards -- Roxas. 
He was an individual who some Filipinos claimed had 
collaborated far more than most Filipinos, but whom other 
Filipinos I talked to (guerrillas and so forth) said 
had helped them. They needed people to play a role close 
.. 
,. 
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to the Japanese and keep tabs on what the Japanese planned 
for controlling population, so that they could take 
countermeasures and keep safe and keep operating. 
But it's very hard to go in after an event and determine 
precisely what a guy has in his heart at the time. But I 
do feel that many of these people -- Aguinaldo, Roxas and 
the others -- actually were trying to help the Resistance 
against the occupation, and doing it in the one way that 
was really open to them to do it. 
Q: Did you ever meet Aguinaldo? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What's your personal evaluation of the man, in connection 
with the early resistance of the 1900s? 
A: When I met him, he was a patriarchal figure. I had 
lunch with him and his granddaughter one day. I was very 
interested in two cannons he had out on the front porch, 
which were remnants of his own campaign against the 
Americans of many years before. So we talked mostly about 
this old campaign and the weapons he had to use, the stuff 
that they would cram in for grapeshots -- rocks and nails 
and such. 
I didn't get a chance then of discussing political 
philosophy with him at all, but he still wore, as did the 
veterans of the campaign, what they called their "rayadillo" 
a uniform, a grey striped seersucker type of material, 
coat and pants -- the uniform of the revoluntionaries against 
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the Americans. And he still dressed in these old clothes. 
But later, just before I left the Philippines, he 
asked to see me again to tell me of his loyalty to the 
United States and the reasons for it, and when I went to 
see him his granddaughter told me that he was too ill to 
see me, and I never got a chance. She gave me some words 
from him orally that he had passed on for her to give me, 
a sort of outline of what he wanted to talk about, but he 
was in effect saying that there were qualities about the 
Americans and things that we believed in that he had to 
share, and that over many, many years, if the Americans 
stuck to their beliefs and their principles, they would 
have the friendship of not only people like him but people 
who had his own beliefs and who lived all over the world. 
He said that this was the one great thing about Americans, 
and that most Americans didn't understand that that was the 
great thing about them. They were looking for the material 
things that they did, but it was the spirit of their 
beliefs that was the real thing about_ Americans. 
It was very touching. I had pubicly expressed thoughts 
in this same vein about the relationship between Filipinos 
and Americans. So, I couldn't tell whether my own words 
were coming back to me, or whether he knew of my beliefs 
and he was trying to reassure me, or what. 
Q: He had a book published just prior to his death, where 
he rea.ffirmed this .same feeling. 
A: That's right. 
,, 
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Q: Speaking of resistance groups I want to touch on one 
controversial topic, and that is the Huks. How useful 
were the Huks as a resistance organization? 
A: Well, they were initially useful in a negative way, in 
that they tied up a lot of Japanese troops who went in and 
almost wiped them out initially. This was in '42, up 
around the Mt Arayat area of Central Luzon. The early Huks 
had grandiose ideas of forming a great army of resistance 
and started to do so, with advice and training by veterans 
of the Chinese Communist 8th Route Army, veterans then in 
the Philippines. 
The Chinese instructors who had been helping the Huks 
in '42 took a dim view of the Huks' ability to learn the 
hard tactics and discipline to be good revolutionaries, 
and to continue existing as a guerrilla army against the 
Japanese occupiers. The Chinese withdrew from being 
advisers with the Huks prior to the big Japanese attack 
on the Huks. The Chinese then started their own guerrilla 
organization, with about 1,500 Chinese in the Philippines, 
and called themselves the Wachi guerrillas. 
Q: Was this among overseas Chinese? 
A: Yes, these were overseas Chinese in the Philippines. 
The Wachi guerrillas were much more subtle than the Huks. 
They were mostly information collectors; they were far more 
clandestine as an organization than a group of guerrillas 
living in the hills. They called themselves guerrillas, 
but while they had some terrorists to enforce their 
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security, mostly they were an intelligence-collecting outfit. 
The Huks were clobbered real hard by the Japanese, and 
it took them some little time to get organized again . In 
the period when they were gathering up their scattered 
remnants and coming up with a sounder organization plan, 
a number of other Filipino groups of guerrillas had grown 
big, some close by the Huks. They weren't communists, and 
didn't want to have any part of the Huks. The Huks, of 
course, had a very definite idea that they were going to 
become top dogs eventually in the Philippines . They weren't 
fighting against the Japanese so much, as fighting for 
their own idea of eventual rule. 
So, from about 1943 on, the Huks were spending more 
time fighting against the other guer rillas -- the Philippine 
guerrillas -- than they were fighting against the Japanese. 
(interruption) 
Q: We were talking about the Huks. What was their local 
program, communist ideology aside? Were they truly 
concerned with the inequities within the Philippine society? 
A: One group of them certainly was. The Socialist party 
members who were from the Agrarian regions of Central Luzon, 
and had initially joined the Socialist party for idealistic 
re~sons -- and that included people like Luis Ta ruc, who 
was their military leader initially wanted to rectify 
injustices to the farmers of Central Luzon who were l argely 
tenant farmers. There were a lot of inequities in land 
court trials, against tenant farmers. It was a v ery poo r 
life for anybody who didn't have his own land. 
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The Socialists merged with .the Communists prior to World 
War II and prior to the Huk movement forming. Among the 
leaders of the Huks were the Communists, who largely had 
been city intellectuals, and who I think might have felt 
for the farmers only as an intellectual exercise, but with 
nothing in their heart for them at all. Then the ex-farm 
boys who were leaders still had a feeling in their hearts 
of wanting to right some rural wrongs. The latter still 
would try to help the people and do some things for them. 
Yet many of the people would be repelled by the manner in 
which the Huks would go after their work, because there 
was almost constant conflict between an intellectual, cold 
demand for discipline and going towards the main objective 
all the time, plus the local folks, who would want to help 
their fellow townsman or their fellow provincial out there 
to get some things, and who still had to come under the 
iron discipline of the Politburo types. This sort of 
schism in the ranks of the Huks continued throughout the 
system, and some of the atrocities that took place were 
by farm boys who feared the iron discipline or had finally 
become accustomed to so~t of blindly carrying out the 
orders of the intellectuals who were saying, "Well, in 
effect you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs, 
and to hell with the bloodshed and so on," which is 
necessary for a revolution, and rather coldly just going 
ahead with it. 
I recall once Taruc himself was dressed down by the 
Politburo, and was made to go through "self criticism" and 
so on, at the height of his power, to show how wrong he'd 
been to have any ideals that might divert even in the 
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the slightest way from the Communist ideal, of having some 
human feelings and so forth. He fought against this, but 
he finally had to go through a "self criticism" session 
just to satisfy the Politburo, of which he was a member at 
the time. 
Q: In 1950, at the personal request of President Quiro ... 
A: Quirino. 
Q: Excuse me, Quirino -- you were transferred to JUSMAG 
in the Philippines, to advise the intelligence service of 
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. What were your duties 
at that time? Could you elaborate on this? 
A: The reason for the request was that my prior service 
in the Philippines had included helping to put together 
the Philippine military intelligence service, the G-2 of 
the Philippine Army, after World War .II, and helping them 
get started, so that my role as an adviser in intelligence 
matters had really started again years before, and was 
rather well known. So in 1950, when the request came 
through for my services again, I was in Washington and was 
doing staff work on cold war problems, with a group that 
consisted of officers and officials from various U.S. 
services, civilian and military, other services in the 
State Department and so on. It was the first attempt of 
the Truman Administration to come up with cold war doctrines 
and practices and so on. 
The request was brought to me by the then chief of 
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JUSMAG, Gen Jonathan Anderson. He told me that the Huks 
had become so dominant in the Philippines that President 
Quirino of the Philippines felt that the Huks were secretly 
dominating the capital city of Manila as well as the country-
side, to the extent that at night he had armored scout 
cars parked around his bedroom and so forth before he'd go 
to sleep. The White House of the Philippines is Malacanan 
Place, and he had armor around his bedroom inside the 
Palace grounds. This was how fearful he was of what was 
happening. He felt that the Philippine intelligence 
service weren't pinpointing the enemy enough so that he 
could start coping with their infiltration of Manila and 
of the countryside. 
At the time, in doing the staff work that I was doing, 
I was far more interested in a subject way past intelligence 
work itself, (of finding out about the enemy), but was 
more concerned about, well, once you find out about him, 
what do you do next? 
I was doing considerable thinking on the subject, and 
producing studies and operational proposals . 
Q: To deviate for just a second, was this the special 
forces concept getting started? 
A: No, the special forces was an army contribution to this 
whole thing, and I had nothing at all to do with the special 
forces, at the time. The staff had been created initially 
by Secretary Forrestal, and this was an amorphous sort of 
an organization that had been put together to cope with 
something that the United States had never coped with before. 
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We were all in a way like blind men on the subject. 
But I told Gen Anderson, and had the backing of the 
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force who was Twining at 
the time, and of the Assistant Secretary of State for Far 
Eastern Affairs was . . not Robertson, it was before 
Robertson, but I can't think at this moment who it was. 
Anyway with their backing I offered to go on out and 
do the intelligence work, but also cope with much more 
than that. 
My advisory service with JUSMAG was negotiated in part 
by Gen Anderson who had been my commanding general previously 
in the Philippines, and we were close friends, and by the 
State Department through the Ambassador out in the 
Philippines, Myron Cowen. They were finally agreed that I 
would work not only on intelligence matters but helping 
with the whole ball of wax of coping with the Huk rebellion. 
This was agreed to by President Quirino and by the then 
chief of staff of the Philippine Armed Forces, Gen Castaneda. 
So I went out to the Philippines with a pretty fuzzy 
but wide term of reference, you might say, of what my 
duties would be, and with the blessing of the Air Force 
and of the State Department, and with both the political 
and the military support from Washington to see what could 
be done in that situation. 
Q: Was this sort of an offspring of this cold war problem 
group? Had you by then formulated certain ideas? 
A: Yes. 
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Q: And you felt that this might be a good place to try 
them out and see if they worked? 
A: Well, I had some ideas, and I had written some memos 
on political warfare and on psychological warfare, and 
I was trying to get the Army to pay more attention to 
psychological warfare -- I should say all of the services, 
but I single out the Army because the Army was the only one 
that still had a vestige of a psychological warfare 
organization. 
And . .. GARBLE ... was a member of the Army group 
that was trying to plan some things to keep unconventional 
operations alive in the Army, and he and the others were 
aiding and abetting what I was trying to do, but once I 
talked to Gen Anderson and it looked as though I was to be 
assigned to the Philippines, I went to anyone in the 
services or out who knew anything about psychological war-
fare during Wo~ld War II, and talked to the ambassador and 
the military attache at the Philippine Embassy, and got all 
of the Philippine military students in the U.S. who were 
attending various courses in all the services all over the 
U.S. to come in on their own at the end of their training 
period. If we could get enough of them together i n 
Washington at one time we would hold a seminar on psy war. 
This was held, as I recall, in June of 1950 in the 
Pentagon, and I had a number of folks who had gone on to 
civilian life. I remember there was one of the reporters 
for Newsweek who had been in psy war in Europe , and there 
were some folks serving with the State Department who had 
been in the military in World War II, and t here were lawye rs 
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and journalists and so forth, who very kindly came in and 
offered their services, and we ran a three day seminar for 
the Philippine military students of the U.S. in June of 
1950 at the Pentagon. I think it was the first psy war 
school after World War II. 
Actually it was a true seminar, in that the instructors 
were curious about the Huk campaign in the Philippines, as 
I was, about what had happened since I left the Philippines 
in 1948. 
We were trying to get up to date on what the problems 
were. The students were talking, and they in turn kept 
saying, "What should we do on this thing?" And the 
instructors were coming up with ideas, and I was getti ng my 
first initiation in psy war, and I was listening real 
hard, and I was asking as many questions as anybody else. 
So I put down psy war as one of the things I was 
trying to carry out along with anything else that would be 
needed in the way of conventional war against the Huks. 
One of the people that I met during this period in 
early 1950 in Washington was a congressman who was chairman 
of the Philippine House Military Affairs Committee. His 
name was Magsaysay. 
He was in Washington lobbying for veteran's benefits. 
The Philippine Army had sent a colonel along to assist 
him, and the Philippine colonel -- Montemayor was a very 
close friend of mine. We had dinner together when the two 
of them got to town, and the colonel told me, "This 
congressman I am with is quite a man, and you've got to get 
to know him." So he brought me together with Magsaysay and 
we started talking about the Huk campaign. 
a 
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I was tremendously impressed by Magsaysay. 
We spent some time together. I was living in the BOQ 
at Fort Myer at the time. And Magsaysay, this colonel and 
I sat there in my small room talking till midnight for 
several nights; we had very long sessions together. 
With the impressions I had, I gave a luncheon for as 
many folks as I could importune in the Pentagon and in the 
State Department, in high level positions, to come and meet 
him. We had a session at the Hotel Washington, in the 
dining room there. I went broke taking them all to lunch, 
I remember that! I meant to expose them to the Philippine 
problems as seen by a man who came roughly from the Huk 
area in Central Luzon, but over on the coast. What he had 
to say was very important, as he had a tremendous feeling 
for the conditions of the people, and why the government 
must try and help them. 
He also had taken some very dim views about the Philippine 
Army and troop misbehavior among civilians. As chairman 
of the House Military Affairs Committee he was trying to 
get them to behave better. He was full of realistic ideas. 
He in turn was very much impressed at meeting officials 
here in Washington, so it was a good thing. 
When I got to the Philippines finally in September of 
1950, I was trying to see about getting supplies out for 
unconventional operations, including loud hailers, parachutes, 
and other things, and was having a hell of a time, because 
the Korean War was going on at that time, and all of our 
supplies were going to Korea. 
I was going to the unknown or the unpopular war, and 
it took me a long time to scrounge second-hand equipment 
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and some condemned equipment that I promised to rehabilitate 
and use. 
I finally got some old beach master equipment loud 
hailers -- from the Navy for landing, and promised to put 
air holes in on their power packs, which otherwise would 
explode from gas production -- the reason they had been 
condemned. 
So all I did was knock holes in the power packs, and 
let them breathe a little bit. Despite the tropical rains 
of the Philippines, they worked and were safe. 
By the time I got to the Philippines, Magsaysay had 
been asked by President Quirino to become Secretary of 
Defense. So when I arrived in the Philippines, I found a 
man whom I had been talking to in Washington, whose ideas 
I agreed with very strongly, who was the civilian leader of 
the effort against the Huks. 
Q: Excuse me, did you or official Washington have anything 
to do with his (Magsaysay) becoming Secretary of Defense? 
A: I suspect that there might have been some influence, 
but it would have been mostly the influence of Americans 
in Manila talking about Magsaysay to President Quirino more 
than anything. I think it would have happened anyhow --
I'll put it that way. I think we might have aided and 
abetted it a little bit by knowing the man, and saying, 
when asked by President Quirino, "Yes, he is a good man." 
That sort of thing, rather than going in and making a deal 
there was none of that. But Magsaysay was very much a 
person in his own right, and very highly esteemed by Quirino, 
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and I am sure this would have happened anyway, even if 
there hadn't been an American interest or anything. 
Q: In the Philippines, after independence in the 50s, were 
the same old families, going all the way back to people who 
had been working with the Spanish since the turn of the 
century, still really in charge of what happened in the 
Philippines? 
A: They were in some sectors. The large property owners 
who were the people that had really gotten along well with 
the Spanish, were the identical people that got along very 
well with the Americans, and who were attempting to influence 
the politics of the independent Philippines, and elected 
their own political leaders. 
However, a rather energetic and aggressive middle class 
was coming up, taking over the power and attempting to carry 
out reforms, and they were very different from the old ruling 
class. Magsaysay was part of the middle class which was on 
the rise. There were a number of other energetic members 
of the reformists, including some who were from the old 
ruling families, but who had gone through the Ateneo College 
and had been taught by Jesuits -- mostly American Jesuits 
at the time -- who were given a social conscience in their 
higher education, and who were very much concerned with the 
lot of the farmers, the lot of the labor movement, and who 
were really leaders in the rank of reform movements of all 
sorts in both political and economic affairs. Some of these 
were , --
Just as I've been saying this I've been seeing the 
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names and faces of a number of them -- some of these were 
the younger sons of some of the old families, and some of 
the old ruling families, including for example some of the 
sugar barons and sugar planters' families, families that 
were as reactionary a group of people as I've ever seen, 
politically and economically. 
Some of their youngsters were Ateneo graduates who 
wanted reform, or who were working in every way they knew 
to better the lot of the farmer in their own families' 
sugar plantations to the extent of really going against 
their families, trying to get land holdings for these 
people, and start co-ops and sugar mills and sugar planting 
associations and so on, and do some uplifting by the 
bootstraps. Some of them were people who hadn't gone to 
Ateneo, who were from some of the old families, but who 
were then in ROTC in high school or college, at the beginning 
of World War II, when the Japanese came in, and as idealistic 
students had gone with some of their ROTC instructors into 
the hills to be guerrillas. They had fought all through 
the war with a dream -- their really idealistic political 
dream -- of. . "Well, the United States is going to give 
us an independent country, and with independence we are 
going to have a sort of Eden here, it's going to be a 
Shangri-la type of perfect state, and this therefore is 
worth a man risking his life for." 
When independence came, and then the Huks started 
their revolt, they couldn't go along with the Huks because 
they'd fought against the Huks among others during the war. 
They were seeking some way of carrying out reforms. Groups 
had joined together and when Magsaysay was appointed secretary, 
Lansdale - 31 
they said, "Ah, there's our man! He is one of us." He 
was a guerrilla leader during the war. They joined in to 
help him. These were people who eventually did things 
like cleaning up the corrupt practices in Customs, who 
carried out land reform measures, and were very aggressive 
in getting compliance to correct practices in the Philippine 
government itself, in the bureaus and so on, who made the 
Philippine civil service employee become a t r u e pub lic 
servant. These were lads from public schools all through 
the Philippines who had been guerrillas and had their 
dreams wrecked afterwards by their own government itse lf 
and by the Huks. 
Q: Sir, we've been talking about Magsaysay and the 
Philippines. Could you tell me what made the dif f erenc e 
with Magsaysay? Why was he able to be so succ essful so 
rapidly? 
A: That's a simple question with a very complex answer. 
There are several main parts to the answer about Mags a ysay. 
Let's see if I can split them up and identify them. First, 
the force being used by the government against the insurrection, 
the Huk guerrillas, was the Armed Forces, which wer e being 
led by officers who had come up through their careers, 
getting promotions etc., through the normal ways of putting 
in so much time and sor t of getting good marks on their 
efficiency reports and being due for promotion and winding 
up as the top leaders without meriting it by solving problems 
such as the Huk rebellion that they were a gainst. I n e ffect , 
you had people occupying a leadership role i n t he Armed 
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Forces who really weren't very inspiring nor good military 
leaders. A civilian Secretary was put into the spot who 
had a very dynamic personality, who was from the troubled 
area where the guerrillas were operating, had grown up there 
as a boy, and worked there as a man later, and had represented 
his district in Congress, so that he knew the political 
feelings of his own constituency and the neighboring 
constituencies. Here was a man who felt the problem in his 
heart as well as in his head, who really started supplying 
the leadership that was needed by the Armed Forces to take 
care of the problem. 
Q: Did you have to have the right name to rise to high 
position in the Armed Forces? 
A: It was a small Armed Forces, a very small professional 
group of Philippine Military Academy graduates so there was 
a very natural family name type of a thing, or rise in 
promotions -- which isn't necessarily a bad thing, mind you --
it was, in effect, helping each other to get ahead. It 
wasn't a knowing clique or anything that was out just to be 
self-serving. I suspect a lot of the promotion was done 
with good faith and good will. "I know this man and he was 
very sound when he was a student" and so on and helping 
him out. A person always thinks better of friends than of 
strangers and there was some of that. But the end result 
was the . Armed Forces of the Philippines was fighting against 
the Huks and not doing it very well, getting clobbered and 
not getting ahead very well. And certainly not being very 
innovative in what they were doing. Also, certainly not 
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being a national army that was close to the people. They 
were further apart than wearing different clothes, such as 
their uniforms, from the people. They felt themselves to 
be an army, and an army behaves differently than civilians 
do and they were very definitely apart from the people. 
Here, their new leader, a civilian, who came into office, 
and incidently followed another civilian, of course, who 
hadn't shown leadership, or the same degree of leadership. 
This civilian came in from the people where the troops were 
operating against the guerrilla enemy and made surprise 
visits to the field, to troop units in operating areas and 
bawl them out, in effect, in his inspections for doing things 
wrong that would have the people locally either angry at 
them for being bad soldiers or laughing at them. He 
started taking corrective actions on his inspections and 
showing up so often in these surprise visits that not only 
the officers commanding units, but also the troops in them, 
started behaving as though this man would suddenly show up 
and be watching them very critically t _o see what they were 
doing. If they did wrong, he was going to call them on the 
carpet for it, start taking some corrective actions against 
individuals personally. Their behavior, even in his absence, 
was "Well, maybe this guy is secretly hiding out someplace 
and watching this." They would start doing an exemplary 
beh~vior pattern just because of that. At the same time, 
when there were things wrong within the military family in 
the way of supplies, equipment being wrong or some very 
just grievance of troops or officers, something beyond the 
normal griping of the field command against headquarters, 
Magsaysay would also listen as well as scold; listen to these 
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complaints and then do something about it, bring about some 
reforms and some changes. In this way, suddenly the people 
who were in the combat areas and carrying on the fight 
suddenly had a champion of their own, as well as a guy that 
might bawl them out for doing the wrong thing. They also 
had a man who would get angry at the right things and move 
to help them so that they felt suddenly they had a leader 
who cared what happened to them. This started almost 
immediately from his first visit out in the field, which 
was then talked about among the troops in combat areas. 
Almost from the first, the morale started lifting. Finally 
they had a guy from headquarters who really cared about 
what happened to them and who would correct things that were 
wrong, whether they were at fault or whether the headquarters 
group was at fault. 
Q: How much effect did the American advisors have on 
pointing out solutions and problems to Magsaysay? 
A: Let me finish this other first. That was one part of 
the change that took place: military leadership. Then it 
was the civilian that was the military leader. Seeing what 
was happening, I talked to President Quirino personally. 
He had invited me in to cabinet meetings to explain some of 
the .Huk problem. I got the President to empower the 
Secretary of National Defense, Magsaysay, to promote, give 
spot promotions to people and also to dismiss officers from 
command when they were doing wrong. In other words, 
strengthen Magsaysay's leadership powers, and did this 
against the objections of the then chief of staff of the 
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Philippine military, and got the support of the top 
governmental leadership behind Magsaysay, to permit him to 
be and act as a real leader of the military effort. 
Now let me say this. Another factor in the change 
that brought success was that Magsaysay also was out in the 
field not only talking to troops but to people in the area 
where combat was going on, and he was asking questions not 
only about how are the troops behaving around here, but what 
is the Government doing here? Do you see the Mayor of a 
city, do you see the Governor of a Province Government? Do 
you see anybody from the Department of Agriculture out here 
helping with irrigation or new seed? And so on. 
He would go from these field visits back to Manila and 
sit in at a Cabinet meeting. As the Cabinet would start 
talking about economy or allocations to the Department of 
Agriculture and so forth, here was a man sitting there who 
would suddenly get mad and pound the table and say, "Mr 
President (or Mr Secretary of Agriculture or whoever), I 
have now just come in, and this is what's really going on, 
and goddamn it you aren't spending the money for the right 
things, and these things aren't happening, and if you don't 
do it right, the other side is going to win, and we are 
going to lose everything. You are going to lose your jobs 
in the Cabinet, and then the Government, and so on." 
So the people suddenly started seeing this man as 
their champion, as well as the troops seeing that, so that 
as they griped to him there'd be some changes, there would 
be a guy from the Department of Agriculture suddenly showing 
up, who hadn't been there for years. His influence or 
leadership expanded tremendously, way past the Armed Forces, 
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so that they suddenly had a man from the capital city who 
would appear to be genuinely interested in what was happening, 
and who could be expected to take some action on the things 
that were wrong, take some action to correct them. And the 
effect was widespread through the area. 
I remember I talked to a guy who was a postmaster of a 
little tiny post office up in the Huk country, and in a 
joking way he told me that Magsaysay had made him an honest 
man. He said, "Every time I sit here and look at my money 
in my stamp drawer -- it isn't much money, but there's some 
there -- I start thinking, Well, I don't have much money and 
my family needs some food, and maybe I ought to swipe some 
of this. Then I start thinking that that damn Magsaysay 
might suddenly show up and be looking over my shoulder just 
as my hand is going into the petty cash drawer, and he'd 
throw me in jail.'' And yet he had never seen Magsaysay. 
But, the stories being told about Magsaysay started getting 
around. 
Now all of this of course caused everything that 
Magsaysay said and did to be magnified and become much 
more effective, so that the situation just seemed to be 
waiting for leadership, and he supplied it. 
Q: Sir, as I asked before, in this work that Magsaysay was 
doing, was he getting advice and guidance from Americans on 
what to do, and what problems needed to be addressed? 
A: Er, this is again a question that's difficult to 
answer. Magsaysay lived with me in my quarters in his 
first months in office as Secretary of Defense, simply 
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because his family home was insecure, and the Huks had sent 
trigger squads in to liquidate this new leader that was 
emerging, and I moved him in with me mostly for his personal 
safety. The difficulty was that we had crowded quarters, 
so that we had to share a room. He had a bed and I had a 
bed, and we became roommates. 
Most of the advice to him at that period was some very 
formal advice from the Chief of JUSMAG, Gen Leland Hobbs. 
The other U.S. military advisers there would advise mostly 
on the U.S. material supplies for the AFP, and not on tactics 
or strategy. 
My advice to him was mostly initially as a good listener 
and friend who let him talk out his problems and would 
single out the salient features and talk back the problem 
to him as he had thought of it, and what I knew of the scene 
as well, and putting values on it in terms of principles 
involved and solutions, and letting him pick the right 
course, which he would do. But it was roughly the way two 
friends would talk with each other. 
Most of his early field visits were done unfortunately 
early in the morning, and I like to sleep and sack in. He 
would go'on these visits early in the morning, and he would 
grab me and have me go along with him, so that I was 
present at most of his early field visits, and very often 
during them I could tip him off to what a good inspector 
would spot and see in a unit, and he would very quickly 
pick up the behavior patterns, although many of the things 
that he did and his own behavior were quite natural with 
him, and he would have done the same whether anybody had 
been around or not. 
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He wore sport clothes -- a sports shirt and a pair of 
slacks on these field visits and he didn't look like the 
Secretary of National Defense: he looked like some guy 
out of the province himself. 
Q: Did he wear the Barong Tagalong shirt? 
A: No, he didn't. He actually in the early days wore an 
aloha shirt, and usually a pretty wild one, so that he was 
definitely a civilian and had absolutely no appearance of 
being a Cabinet officer or a top guy in the Government. 
Frequently we would fly in by L-5 aircraft close to the 
scene, and Magsaysay would go on the road and thumb rides 
for the two of us, and I was in uniform, so that as people 
would hesitate I would step up and say, "This man is the 
Secretary of Defense," and I would sort of act as his 
guarantor that he was for real. And I had to do that with 
troops as well, who were incredulous when we first showed 
up, but the fact that I was an officer of the United States 
Air Force in uniform would vouch for this guy, and it really 
would cause them to take a second look at him and listen 
to him. This was in the very early days. He quickly became 
known, of course. 
But I remember that on our very first visits I had to 
explain to the men and the officers and so on in these units 
who the guy was. At the time, because of the fighting that 
was going on in Central Luzon, (down to the suburbs of 
Manila, the capital city), most of the Americans including 
the U.S. military types were not permitted to wander 
around the countryside, and Gen Hobbs made an exception for 
me, and let me wander around. 
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It wasn't until well over a year later that Hobbs 
finally assigned an officer of JUSMAG to go out in the 
field. I had a small staff of my own, and I got an exception 
made for us to wander around where we felt like. I have 
always felt that you have to see something firsthand to 
really know what's happening, so I wanted us to be free to 
move, and we were given that freedom. 
Most of the U.S. advisers there in JUSMAG were going 
between the JUSMAG compound, where they lived and had their 
offices, a couple of miles up the road to the Philippine 
Armed Forces Headquarters, where they'd sit in with the G-1, 
2, 3, 4, and so on, and with the chief of the Air Force, or 
whatever, and do office work with them. It was mostly on 
supply and handling hardware, systems for keeping hardware 
going and so on. 
The new advice really that Magsaysay got -- and that I 
got myself -- came about, and the only way I can think of 
to describe it, is by coffee klatsch sessions. I had 
noticed and learned from getting the Philippine officers 
together for the psy war seminar in the Pentagon before I 
went out, that there were a number of Philippine officers, 
as well as Philippine civilians, who were concerned about 
what was happening, who had ideas on what to do about it; 
some of them were wild schemes, some of them were very 
practical, some of them were very big schemes, some of 
them were very little things . 
So; with Magsaysay living in the house, of course, we 
had a stream of officers from Headquarters coming in to see 
him, and he used to start off the day holding office at the 
breakfast table at my place, and there wou ld be his aides 
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there, and then there would be some of the staff from 
Headquarters, who would have to sit and take turns for seeing 
him. Since it was my house I'd give them coffee and I would 
sit and talk with them while others were doing business with 
the Secretary of Defense. I'd be talking with the visitors 
there, and I also had many visitors of my own, including 
some of the field commanders of the Philippine Armed Forces, 
who would come in not to see Magsaysay, but who would come 
in for 24 hours' leave and wanted a little R & R for them-
selves. We had been friends from years before and they were 
used to coming by and telling me what was happening in their 
areas of operation, looking for a little bit of hand holding 
or a pat on the head or understanding for what they were 
going through in combat. 
So we would get a mix of Headquarters types and field 
types together, of all ranks. The folks coming in from the 
field ran from unit commanders and the big commanders down 
to sergeants or less, whom I had known before. So we had 
this tremendous mix of people sitting around drinking 
coffee in my place, and we were talking shop, because the 
one thing we were doing was fighting a war against the Huks. 
A G-3 type would tell about some study they were doing in 
his staff, maybe trying to figure out what you do with 
prisoners or something. The field guys would start telling 
their experiences, and then what the people really wanted. 
We would actually wind up with a lot of ideas being generated 
there, which led to such things as the EDCOR, (the rehabilit-
ation of Huk prisoners), of giving them a chance to own their 
own farms, having a place for housing their visiting families 
when the prisoners were in the stockade, helping the families 
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get in to see them, appealing to active Huks to come in and 
surrender. Many of the good ideas of the Huk rebellion came 
out of these little coffee klatsch meetings in the house. 
What would happen was, as we got to talking, sometimes 
we'd forget that the Secretary of Defense was sitting there 
trying to do business a few yards away, sitting at the 
breakfast table, and we were just around a little corner, 
talking. Our voices would rise up a bit, and the next 
thing we knew, Magsaysay would come out and have a cup of 
coffee with us. So here we were getting ideas presented 
right at his level as well, you see. And every so often 
he'd say, "Well, let's try that." Then he would go on down 
to Malacanan Palace and talk to the President and the 
Cabinet and get Government backing for a project. 
A G-3 type would be sitting there, or a G-1 or somebody 
from Headquarters, and he would say, "I'll do the staff 
work," and he'd run back to do it. Field commanders would 
be there saying, "Give us a chance at that, too, and we'll 
make the thing work out there." So we would have ideas 
started and created and sort of staffed out and taught in a 
very informal work session, but then almost immediately 
solved as far as the staffing of the thing was concerned, 
and all of the paperwork and the backing and so on, and we 
would get something generated very quickly. This is an 
unusual way of working things out that I have used in many 
places in the world, including Vietnam, and I can assure 
you that it works. It's the most simple and the most 
natural way of working in the world, far more than the formal 
meetings that Americans hold with foreigners all the time. 
In these meetings, there was nothing formal. These 
,, 
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were a group of people who knew each other and who were 
relaxing over a cup of coffee and were sitting close enough 
to each other so that they didn't have to get up and make 
speeches or anything. A guy could lean back in a chair and 
have his feet propped up on a table or something, and sound 
off on something in a very relaxed way. The guy sitting 
next to him could do the same, and ideas would really spring 
forth, and also the very practical ways of implementing 
these ideas would come up. 
Q: That sounds very good. 
(end of side l of tape) 
Q: Sir, after the success of Magsaysay, the Huk rebellion 
was virtually crushed, but today there seems to be a 
resurgence as the Huks become again more active. Problems 
in the Philippines seem to be getting worse instead of 
better. Is there any simple reason that you can give for 
this? 
A: The Huks themselves -- the ones that Magsaysay defeated 
were defeated as much for political reasons as for military 
reasons. Their slogans, their recruiting, and their 
organizing reasons as stated were all met politically by 
social actions or political actions of the Government and of 
the armed forces against them, so that they had no reason to 
fight again. Now the rules that the Government and the 
military followed were the rules that are stated in the 
Philippine Constitution and in the Philippine Electoral 
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Code. They are part of the rules that the Filipinos them-
selves have set to govern themselves, and they are good 
rules. So, in effect, the Huks were defeated as soon as 
the people on the Government side actually followed their 
own rules, and once they did that, the Huks had no reason 
to overthrow the Government, because it became a government 
of and by and for the people. 
So, if the Philippine Government had been true to its 
own rules right along, and if it had been a government of, 
by, and for the people, no people would try and overthrow 
it, because it was their own, and there are orderly ways of 
changing things with it. 
So the only way that a group of rebels could start 
again would be if the people felt that the rules weren't 
being followed anymore, that there were privileged exceptions 
to the rules, and that there were just grievances that 
the people had, to be solved in no other way except by armed 
force, so that in effect the following that the Huks would 
have today, by and large, would be from people dissatisfied 
with the way the rules are worked out by the Government. 
Now, this of course clearly indicates where a blame 
might lie, and also where a solution might lie. In other 
words, if the Government itself really was true to its 
principles of governing, as laid down in the Constitution 
and in the Electoral Code, then there wouldn't be any 
grievances really that couldn't be met by peaceful means and 
by people trying to solve the problems that the country 
faces, and there wouldn't be Huks fighting against the 
constitutional government. The Huks would be primarily 
what they were when they started up again in their first 
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resurgence -- frankly bandits and racketeers. Starting 
again, they were made up mostly of criminals, not of political 
fighters. Pretty common stickup artist type guys who 
became protection racketeers, mostly close to the big U.S. 
bases there, where they had nightclubs and beer parlors, 
and gals hanging out in houses where they would let the 
criminal element grow up with protection rackets or girl 
rackets, gambling and all the usual things. 
The Huks went from that criminal boss activity -- and 
they weren't politically motivated initially in their resurgence, 
but gradually, as people were looking for another polarization 
to find some solutions to their grievances, and of course 
getting into the political field, as the Government wasn't 
satisfying their political needs, a lot of the crooks and 
so forth then started becoming political. Initially they 
did it like a political Boss Tweed or something, in Tammany, 
of turning out the electorate again for money mostly, and for 
influence of congressmen and so forth, who would get elected 
from there, but with a very bright remnant left of some of 
the Communist Party folks, the theoretical end of the thing, 
saying, "Here is real opportunity knocking, and I don't care 
if a man is a crook and so forth, he's got some power in a 
place where there is dissatisfaction." And they started 
moving in on the thing and giving it a political polarization 
again, as the old Huks had. But the initial basis of this 
was very different than that of the original Huks, in that 
now they were really racketeers. 
I know that the U.S. Air Force the 13th Air Force at 
Clark Air Force Base -- I am sure that their security files 
are filled with things like simple theft, armed robbery and 
,, 
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the racketeering and protection rackets, the gambling, girls 
and so on, in nearby towns, close to the base, that gave the 
start to guys who now command this that and the other thing 
of a Huk armed force. The genesis of this thing is quite 
different than the Agrarian reform movement of the initial 
Huks, when the Agrarian Socialist Party of Central Luzon 
merged with the Communist Party of Manila City, the water-
front laborers and other ''proletariat", to initially field 
an army of original Huks during the Japanese time. So 
that today's types are now a militant expression of 
dissatisfaction with the Government. And I think the 
solution again basically is one of government reform and so 
on, and giving some justice to all, as a way of solving the 
problem again. 
The recycling theory might be correct, since the area 
where this is happening today is the same area where the 
agrarian malpractices caused some trouble earlier, and where 
a sort of a scrappy population had taken on the first 
American pacification forces during the so-called "Philippine 
Rebellion" at the very beginning of this century, but had 
also fought Spanish armies during the old Spanish colonial 
days. There had been big fights around and in places 
which have since been the same places where the later Huks 
stood and fought against the Philippine Armed Forces, and 
where today's racketeering Huks are operating. All the 
same area. 
So there might be something sociological ly -- an 
association between the man on the land and the poor soil 
or something, not letting him get a good living, a man's 
feeling of frustration from birth almost that he was not 
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given a fair break in life, might well cause this. But 
again, if there is a government that says, "We are your 
government," and actually behaves that way to the point 
where he feels that his government is very responsive to his 
problems and his needs, and that he can work with it, then 
they can start meeting on some of the problems that exist. 
It's obvious that they aren't doing this, and therefore 
he is taking the other way to get redress for his grievances. 
Q: Are you being consulted at all by the Philippine Government? 
A: No. 
Q: That's too bad. Sir, in 1953 you joined Gen O'Daniel's 
mission to the French forces in Indochina. What was your 
capacity, and what effect did you have on American-French 
relationships after you'd been there for a while? 
A: I was picked out on sort of the spur of the moment. 
was in the Philippines when the O'Daniel mission was en 
route to Saigon, and at the last minute, so to speak, 
I 
O'Daniel asked me to join the mission and come along with him. 
When I arrived in Saigon with him the French were 
quite surprised that I was there, and a number of the staff 
officers close to Gen Navarre, who had just assumed the 
French command, had known of what I had been doing in the 
Philippines, and were very worried about me as a revolutionary 
type who might stir up the natives against the French. So, 
as far as my relations with the French, I might say it was 
one of watchful waiting on their part, always fearing the 
worst. 
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However, Gen Navarre seemed to welcome my arrival. He 
was putting together his plan, as well as O'Daniel doing a 
report on what the French needed. So between Navarre and 
O'Daniel I was assigned the task of coming up with thoughts 
for Navarre on the unconventional annexes to his plan. 
"Unconventional'', in this wise, were the annexes on 
what they called Maquis or guerrilla forces that were operated 
by the French, (in 1953 they were largely Maquis, among the 
Montagnards of the mountain tribal people of the Indochina 
states), and psychological warfare by the French and 
Vietnamese forces primarily, and of intelligence collection, 
particularly combat intelligence. 
Then, by chance, I got in with the French airborne 
paratroopers, and worked out some thoughts with them up in 
the regions of the North Headquarters, at Hanoi, with the 
French airborne and Gen Cogny's staff on these airborne 
operations, based from the Red River delta perimeter. 
So the ann~es contained sort of a mixed bag of clandestine 
Ops and secret missions and intelligence collection type of 
things. Working on these plan annexes permitted me to get 
in and talk shop with the French officers who were involved 
with all of this. It was on their own operations and ideas 
on how to better them, and often on how a field command 
could get more help from Headquarters to let them do a good 
job. The French Army was no different than any other army 
in that respect . Frequently the Headquarters staffs would 
look on what these particular unconventional types were 
doing as something sort of esoteric and not really military 
and not actually needed, and would give them short change in 
the way of airlift or weapons or whatever else they needed. 
So most of the people that I was working with would 
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immediately telli me how misunderstood they were by their 
own higher command, and would have a long list of needs . 
But the problem about these needs always would be, "Can 
you get them to understand what I am trying to do and support 
me?" So that usually the No. 1 problem was the understanding 
that was lacking -- the understanding of the needs that they 
had. There was need for more understanding. 
Q: I've heard that one of the problems with the French was 
that they were sort of road-bound, and really didn't like 
to operate in small unit actions in the jungle. 
true or false? 
Is this 
A: Well, it's largely true, not entirely so. They 
certainly had a number of French officers who were serving 
for very long periods of service in Indochina, much longer 
than any U.S. military have ever served there. There would 
be officers I'd run into that had served 8 or 9 years there 
consecutively , 10,000 miles away from ~ome and away from 
their families in France, with no home leave and no break 
from their service, who were dedicated to the struggle that 
they were in, and would become very close to groups of 
people on the ground there, who had a very genuine affection, 
I think, for the people, and ~ho had finally worked into 
types of service that would permit them to serve in among 
them. Many of the French Maquis leaders and advisers who 
were in with the tribal people had been adopted by the 
tribes, and they shacked up with native gals, and were 
partically part of the tribes that they were serving in. 
And they certainly were far from being road-bound types. 
L 
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The same was true of a lot of the French airborne 
types out there, who were sort of the cream of the French 
professional fighting men, whose one major complaint to me 
was that none of the generals seemed to know how to use them 
correctly. And again there was a plea for understanding of 
the airborne role, where they wanted to get away from the 
sort of old fashioned conventionality of their leaders and 
really do some envelopement of the enemy from the air and 
surprise him, and get into places that they couldn't get to. 
But their main complaint was that they were usually used 
as an airborne unit designated as a support unit and dropped 
in to a support position to infantry that moved into an 
area by truck. They said that it would have been just as 
easy to move us in by truck as the infantry that we were 
going in to support. They were right, of course. 
What they wanted to do was to get away from the normal 
type of thing, get out beyond the normal infantry tactics, 
and drop in behind the enemy some place, and operate in a 
much freer fashion than they had. So taking just this one 
example of their airborne operations, which they later 
after I was there -- started using in a less conventional 
way, I would say from what they told me and from what I 
saw that by and large the French were road-bound. Not only 
that, but they were thinking in terms of positional war 
when they put up forts, to guard first of all bridges, and 
then to guard villages, as well as fortified zones for 
guardin~ rice producing areas. 
All of this was positional warfare in their thinking, 
against an enemy who wasn't thinking positional warfare at 
all and who would cross their lines at night and do other 
very unfair things to the conventional types. This enemy 
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moved around them and continued a war of movement against 
the French who were thinking positional war. French use of 
roads and equipment actually, although it looked like a 
war of movement, kept them into narrow corridors and zones, 
and was in essence a positional warfare concept, with an 
enemy going on foot and not paying attention to it. 
Then, when the French got real daring and would try 
the unconventional, they would essentially do commando type 
raids. They would go in and shoot everything in sight, 
burn down what was there, and destroy means of support to 
an enemy. Since the enemy was basing his support among the 
people, this meant burning down the homes of people, blowing 
up bridges that people would use, and leaving a scorched 
earth behind that would make all of the people on the scorched 
earth hate those who had brought it about. So, in effect, 
these commando type of raids which were looked on as very 
unconventional operations, actually were causing great harm 
in a very conventional sense to the cause of the French, and 
were letting the political cadres among the Communist troops 
go in and recruit the villagers and farmers to pay back the 
enemy for doing these horrible things to them. The people 
would say, "Yes, I'd like to pay the French back." 
Q: Was Dien Bien Phu supposed to be an air head for 
activities in the rear? In other words, although it had a 
position in terms of protecting Laos, was it also supposed 
to act as a focal point for guerrilla and true unconventional 
activities in the rear of the Viet Minh? 
A: Dien Bien Phu was intended to prove the theory that, if 
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you could ever get guerrilla forces lured onto a killing 
ground where you'd have enough fire power t o liquidate the 
guerrillas, you'd win the war against guerrillas. In 
effect this was supposed to be a very large trap, to lure 
the Viet Minh guerrillas onto a killing ground, where you 
could have not only the guns, but you'd have airstrips and 
a way of mounting air power quickly against them tactically, 
and you'd get an enemy lured into a place where you could 
kill him. The fact that the enemy also looked at the Fr ench 
putting up positions there and were saying, to themse,Lveis:, , 
"Gee, these guys are getting on to our killing ground," 
didn't mean that the guerrillas .. well, the guerrillas 
made better use of this theory than the French did, who 
had conceived it and tried to implement it. 
Now the first thing that the guerrillas did was to take 
the high ground overlooking the forts at Dien Bien Phu. 
Unfortunately for the French, the killing ground wasn' t 
the troop killing ground that the French had picked , since 
the high observation points weren't manned by the French 
in the mountains around there. When the enemy o c cupi ed the 
high mountains surrounding Dien Bien Phu, he immediately got 
observation of the French, so that as the enemy brought up 
artillery , i t was really the first time that the e nemy 
could ever observe his artillery fire, correct it, and make 
it very effective. So the first thing that caught the 
French by surprise was Viet Minh artillery , for the first 
time coming in and being very accurate and knocking out the 
French guns and the French forts and the French troops. 
Instead of correcting that, which got more a nd more 
difficult as time went on, the French never got the e n emy 
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off of the high point where he could observe what he was 
doing, and using long range weapons. They tried air power 
against it, but the bombing was very poor. It certainly 
didn't drive the enemy off the high ground. If anybody 
ever said it was effective, it wasn't effective enough to 
change that part of the situation. 
The enemy cut the roads and started a seige. With 
artillery support, accurately observed fire, he then mounted 
ground attacks that started succeeding, while the French 
kept beefing up their bad positions down actually in the 
bottom of the bowl in the hills -- they kept putting more 
targets in for the enemy to hit. There were very brave 
men on the French side. I know that they used to go around 
at the headquarters of the French Army, like in Saigon, 
announcing that they were getting an airlift into Dien Bien 
Phu, at that time that the airlift used the airstrips at 
Dien Bien Phu, but these later were knocked out, and 
reinforcements would have to jump in by 'chute, so that it 
was a one way trip for the guys who would go there. 
Mind you, many volunteer reinforcements were headquarter 
types, hardly the bravest men in the world ordinarily. But 
the call would say that they could take, say, 50 guys in. 
They'd say, "We want volunteers," and everybody assembled 
there would take one pace forward and volunteer, everybody. 
Then they would select the 50 that they could take that 
morning. But it was a one way trip for these guys, and 
they knew it. They knew that they'd jump in and t here was 
no way for them of getting out again. And yet every day 
there were volunteers. These were very courageous guys. 
You can call them foolish or anything else, but you certainly 
have to admit that they were courageous. 
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Q: Giap has intimated on occasion that Dien Bien Phu was 
a lot closer thing than most people realize. Is that some-
thing he just does for the dramatic effect, or was it close? 
A: Well, certainly a lot of the enemy were killed in that, 
but as far as a close thing is concerned I talked to some of 
the French who were taken prisoners at Dien Bien Phu and were 
later released. When they were en route through Saigon on 
the way home to Metropolitan France, they told me not only 
about the battle but about what happened afterwards. As 
prisoners, some of them were taken by the Viet Minh down to 
Dien Bien Phu to recreate the battle for the official 
movies of the Communists on what happened there. They were 
to reenact the defeated French, you see, and as they got 
back to Dien Bien Phu in their old fortified positions, 
they were amazed to find them under water. 
What had happened was that Giap occupying the Heights 
at the beginning of the watershed had diverted streams, 
any water flows and gullies, with crews of laborers digging 
new streambeds, to direct all the water down the water shed 
and onto the French fortifications. When the rains came, 
it was just like turning on a faucet in a bathtub. The 
French forts were down at ~he bottom of the bathtub, and 
all this water just came down and flooded the area. 
So, if it was a close thing it must have been political 
pressure on Giap to win a victory by the time Geneva met. 
The Geneva negotiations were then taking place, with the 
political representatives of the Viet Minh present at 
Geneva, the pressure was for a victory, useful i n Genev a 
bargaining, rather than any physical thing on the battlefield, 
I think. So it's a political timing "close" thing . 
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I personally think that if I had been a political boss 
of Giap I would have started asking him, "Why did you have 
so many guys making suicidal attacks and get creamed in 
attacking the forts, when you could have held on just a 
little bit and ground off the French there?" 
Q: I guess from what you said that it must have been a 
political thing. 
A: It must have been, and that again says an awful lot 
about an enemy, and the same enemy that we are fighting too. 
Where politics fits in his thinking -- it's all part of the 
same war. 
Q: Sir, you mentioned earlier that the French soon began 
to dislike you very much, particularly right at the 1954-
1955 time period. Could you explain why this was? 
A: I am not certain that I have firm answers on this. I 
felt at the time -- and I still suspect it might be true 
that they were looking for some reason why they were defeated 
in Indochina. Being human they did a very human thing. 
Instead of looking in a mirror to take a look at the guys 
who were there and were defeated, they started looking 
elsewhere, and thinking that certainly some outside influence 
somewhere must have had a hand in this, and at that time I 
had become close to Diem who was the new Prime Minister that 
was sent in by Bao Dai, and so they figured that somehow or 
other I was turning the Vietnamese against them -- against 
the French, that is -- and therefore must have somehow or 
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other had the Vietnamese defeat them during the Franco-Viet 
Minh War, even though I wasn't there except for a brief 
visit in '53. They wanted a scapegoat. 
In their emotionalism on this, they even started 
claiming that I was trying to start World War III. I have 
never been able to come up with any rational explanation of 
why all this was. I do know that it was present, and that 
some of the French magazines and newspapers reflected that. 
At the time, they saw me as a very villainous figure who 
was working against the French, which simply wasn't true. 
One odd thing was that the French had agreed already to 
the independence of Vietnam, and yet I was in part blamed 
for wanting the Vietnamese to be independent of the French. 
It was something that had been agreed to by the French 
themselves long before I showed up on the scene. 
I was blamed for a number of other things that frankly 
were already statements on paper, proposed by French 
politicians and leaders in France, and had been agreed to 
internationally. And yet it struck the people on the ground 
that somehow or other this was all new. 
far as I am concerned. 
It's irrational as 
A Swiss journalist who was there at the time tried to 
explain it to me one time. I am not sure his explanation 
was valid, but he said that the French are very emotional 
people, and when it comes to the Vietnamese it's a little 
bit as though it were a man who had a mistress, who had 
gotten tired of the mistress and was leaving and said the 
mistress was free. All of a sudden, one day, he sees his 
ex-mistress going by in a new Cadillac, and here is this damn 
other guy -- meaning you, or an American -- who's got the 
• 
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mistress there in this Cadillac going by, and even though the 
man had already given up his mistress and so forth, he says, 
"The only way that guy could get a girl like that would be 
with a new Cadillac." So among other things, the French 
claim that I was buying the friendship and loyalty of the 
Vietnamese, and every time that they would ever mention 
an activity of mine, it would usually be that I was out with 
a suitcase full of piastras -- millions of dollars worth of 
money -- buying somebody. This wasn't true at all, but 
they could only see that the wealthy American was out buying 
off the people to dislik e the French. 
Now the fact that a lot of the people out in the 
countryside didn't like the French -- that even if they 
hadn't been Communists , they were fighting as nationals 
against the French for their independence, long befor e I 
ever showed up on the scene, and having this burning desire 
to be free and independent were thus anti-French -- that 
didn't seem to e n ter into French thinking at all. All 
they could see was that when I became friends with these 
same people, being an American and not wanting them as a 
colony or anything, and simply moving around among the people 
and trying to help them as far as I could out of friendship, 
seeing me c l ose to the people they tried to ascribe some 
kind of reason for this, so they figured I must be paying 
them, which of course I never did. 
of that. 
I frequently was accused 
One of the accusations came about in a formal , official 
briefing one day. I forget who it was I think i t was 
the U.S. Army Chief of Staff from the Pentagon who wa s 
visiting Vietnam. There was a military brief ing for him 
V 
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at MAAG Headquarters, I had been busy on staff work, so I 
showed up at .the briefing a bit late and sat down in the rear 
row, just to hear what was going on. As I sat down, I 
heard a French officer (who was part of the briefing team) 
briefing these visitors from Washington, describe about 
Col Lansdale -- myself -- being down in the country trying 
to buy the loyalty of a Hoa Hao rebel by the name of BA Cut 
at that very moment. He went on about how stupid I was not 
to know that BA Cut had lured me down there just to get the 
suitcase full of money that I had. He added that Americans 
such as myself were the thing that was ruining everything 
in the relationships between the French and people like 
BA Cut and other Vietnamese. When he paused for breath I 
spoiled the story. I got up and asked, "Go on, tell me, 
was I killed or not this afternoon down there?" Here he 
was, thinking I was at 100 miles distance, and believing 
it, and telling this story. He got so mad at me he shut 
up and left the room. Later, he wouldn't speak to me at 
all. Apparently the French believed these stories. Now 
here was a highranking French professional soldier, giving 
an official briefing to a high ranking professional soldier 
from Washington on the situation, telling just sheer fantasy, 
and undoubtedly believing it as he told this fairy tale. 
The fact that I not only wasn't carrying money, but wasn't 
present in the area where he said this was happening, and 
was physically visible present many miles away and in the 
presence of these people, never stopped the French from 
keeping on telling that same damn story! I was blamed and 
accused of this on and on and on, all the time I was there. 
Now what would cause people to do that? And how to 
Lansdale - 58 
get them to stop? I don't know. It baffled me. Even 
when it was demonstrably untrue, the stories continued. 
I don't think it would ever get beyond this. 
I think the French were just hurting very very much 
from their defeat, and they were just hoping that they 
weren't to blame themselves, or were hoping somehow or 
other that some dirty foreigner some place had really caused 
that harm to France. And there I was, quite visible. So 
I became the butt of it. 
Q: Did you subsequently play a role toward Diem that was 
similar to your role with Magsaysay? 
A: Well I was seeing Diem almost every day. (interruption) 
Q: Sir, you were saying that you were seeing Diem every 
day. What sort of relationship evolved? 
A: Initially, I saw him the day after he first returned to 
his country as Prime Minister in '54, I watched the way he 
came in, seeing the mistakes that he made in the way he 
came into the City of Saigon from the airport. He disappointed 
the many, many, many thousands of people who'd lined the 
streets to welcome him. Somebody had advised him, apparently, 
to be wary of the people. He came by in a closed car 
maybe 60 MPH, with a motorcycle escort. Nobody got a chance 
to see him. The people were emotionally upset by Communist 
victories and thought that here was a man who was going to 
save them. They wanted to cheer him, see him, demonstrate, 
and he didn't give them a chance to do so. I figured 
J 
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he must be getting some very bad advice from his family and 
from Vietnamese friends. Thus, I wrote a memo that night, 
suggesting some actions that Diem might consider following. 
I checked them out the next morning with the ambassador and 
the chief of MAAG who told me to go ahead and show it to 
Diem. I looked up Diem at the palace and introduced myself, 
giving him these suggested ideas. Mostly, they were what 
I had learned from the Vietnamese people. They covered a 
wide range of subject matter, of things that the Vietnamese 
people were aspiring for and hoped would get a response on 
the part of one of their leaders. 
He kept my memo, and he invited me to stop by and see 
him again. I did so. A relationship finally evolved 
where I would sit and talk to him almost every day -- not 
every day, but almost. Very frequently. As he started 
running into terrible problems, and as these problems 
mounted, I became sort of a safe confidant for him to admit 
the size and nature of some of his problems and his own 
worries about being able to resolve some of the things that 
he was coming up against, and use me as a sort of a sounding 
board to try out ideas and so on. In turn, I tried to give 
him the help that I had given Magsaysay, responding by 
summarizing what he had said, but in a form stressing the 
principles involved and enumerating and the factors that 
a man should look at and examine very closely in order to 
make a decision. By laying this out for him verbally, it 
would help him clarify the issues in his mind, so that he 
could then make a decision. He apparently found this quite 
useful. This was the basis of our relationship. 
Also, part of my advice at the time was to get Diem --
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a r a ther shy, retiring type of a person who was happiest 
when he was secluded in his room or office or study, reading 
books and documents and being a scholar, -- getting that 
type of a person out into the provinces and streets talking 
to enough people to get an idea from people from all walks 
of life of what they were thinking and hoping and doing, 
meeting them on a ground where he could be eye to eye with 
them and they wouldn't be trying to satisfy a great leader 
or something, but ~here they would be talking between 
human beings. So a lot of my early pushing at him was 
pushing him into visits around the countryside and seeing 
what was going on. 
Fortunately, the people were hungry for Vietnamese 
leadership at the time, and responded very enthusiastically 
to his appearances among them. As a matter of fact, he was 
much more popular than any historian has ever given him 
credit for being . I have photographs of him in those days, 
and just taking a look at the crowds that came around and 
the look of delight and sort of affection in their faces and 
in their eyes as they met this man and talked to him, you 
can tell that they were happy to see him. This, in turn, 
meant a great deal to Diem and bouyed him up a bit, so that 
he started enjoying getting out and talking to people, 
and who wouldn't? It's very flattering for a man to be 
loved, and the people loved him, so as he became more and 
more sure of himself. The more he was learning of what the 
people really felt and what their needs were, they were 
becoming more and more candid with him. 
This remained largely true for the extent of my service 
in Vietnam. I left at the end of 1956. When I left, I 
,I 
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left a very popular Veitnamese leader running things, a man 
who was being very responsive to the needs of the people. 
I thought the show was on the road when I left. 
Things did change afterwards. But he was a very likeable 
human being when I knew him in those years, and a man who 
went through some terrible crises of leadership and opposition 
and decisions that were very, very trying in a human sense, 
that would have been trying on any leader. Anybody in that 
spot would have sort of gone through the same fire that 
Diem had to go through. He was handed tragic, vast problems 
that were enough to wreck any human spirit, but he had the 
courage and the integrity to handle the situation. I came 
to have great respect for him by watching what was happening 
right close to him, and the way he met his problems. We 
became close personal friends. 
\ 
Q: But by 1963 it seems that he had lost this personal 
touch. My own observation there was that he was a stranger 
in a palace, and unapproachable, and very afraid people 
surrounded him in Saigon. 
A: National leadership and the power that goes along with 
it of course has corruptive elements in it. Unless a person 
is very, very aware of corrupting influences at work, he 
becomes the victim of his own power. In Diem's case, he 
had a brother who gathered information for him, and initially 
I am talking about his brother Nhu, his younger brother --
the man had political organizations based in labor unions 
that had very accurate, true information on the way that 
labor and some of the farmers and farm union organizations 
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felt about things. So this was very useful. But again, I 
think Nhu became corrupted by running an espionage net or 
an intelligence net, and always figuring that he had the 
latest inside word of what was going on. He became more 
assertive as he gave this invorrnation to his brother, and 
both of them started substituting the information that came 
in to them from these nets for their personally going out 
and finding out things first-hand. Evidently they didn't 
realize that this was putting up a sort of a glass wall 
between themselves and the people. With it, they started 
getting lost. They became in effect the tools, unwittingly 
so, of the people supplying the information, who all too 
often, seeing their own power, started aiming for their own 
more and more selfish ends, telling them what the situation 
was in terms benefiting self-interest, or even inventing 
things just to keep the payments corning for supplying 
information. It was a very corrosive type of situation 
a leader permitting himself to get separated from the 
people. And Nhu was an intellectual . . I suspect that he 
became convinced that he was the brightest guy that ever 
came down the pike, and pretty soon talked himself into 
thinking that he was brighter than his brother Diem, and 
became a bit impatient with his brother on his brother's 
caution over some moves and plans and started forcing his 
own opinions on Diem more and more. 
I last saw Diem in '61 (in the fall) and even at that 
period he was a very different individual than the man I 
had left in 1956. When we met in '61, it was the first 
time that I can recall, ever, that his brother Nhu sat 
with him while we were talking about very personal things, 
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in sort of personal friendship confidence between ourselves. 
His brother Nhu would sometimes answer the questions that I 
put to Diem, and I would have to explain and say, "I am 
talking to your brother, not to you. I asked Diem what 
he thought." And Nhu kept supplying the answer for his 
brother and Diem would agree with him. 
This was a strange relationship that I hadn't seen 
before. 
Just what had happened there I don't know. But changes 
are what you get sometimes when you go back and see old 
friends after years of absence. Then you start wondering, 
"What's the guy been up to that he ever developed this way? 
He is a different person." I just don't know. By the time 
of his overthrow and death in '63, I t hink the change had 
become set in concrete, and had probably gone much further 
than anything I ever saw. From what people were telling me 
about Diem in '63, he sounded like a stranger to me from 
the man I knew. But what caused that, I really don't know. 
Q: About 1961, I guess, an organization was formed, known 
as Jungle Jim, which became the predecessor for the 
development of Air Force counter-insurgency forces. Could 
you, sir, fill us in on the evolution of the separate Air 
Force units dedicated to counter-insurgency? 
A: That came about during the Kennedy Administration, and 
I would say that the true genesis of that as far as an 
official act would be came from the President personally, 
that is Kennedy. Kennedy had asked the Chiefs, in a meeting 
with him to take action that would give him some capability 
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of handling unconventional warfare. Each of the Chiefs 
responded somewhat differently. The Army already was ahead 
of the game, by only a few months with their Special Forces. 
The Special Forces originally had not been organized for 
counter-insurgency, but had been a force intended to work 
with guerrilla forces in support of regular forces in a 
conventional war, (probably World War III). 
Near the end of the Eisenhower Administration, some 
of the Army Special Forces people had been encouraged by me 
personally -- and some had come up and worked on my saff in 
the Pentagon -- to take a more active role in counter-
insurgency in an attempt to understand and to offer services 
wherever the U.S. became involved. The Army at the time 
had been very reluctant to approve a doctrine of that sort 
their doctrines on this had been developed at Leavenworth, 
and Leavenworth hadn't come up with an Army counter-
insurgency doctrine. The doctrine was done very informally 
down at Fort Bragg. Was it Bragg? Yes, where the Special 
Forces Center is. 
Q: Yes. (cross talk) 
A: It had been worked out by the Special Forces staff 
there, partially by those that were on temporary duty in my 
office in the Pentagon. I encouraged some of the Cabinet 
members and high ranking military in the Army to go down and 
visit Bragg at the time. Officers at the center, bless 
their hearts, had the courage to stand up in front of the 
VIPs and give the doctrine that they were going to follow 
from then on, which was hardly official. This was right at 
the end of the Eisenhower Administration. 
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We got word of this over to the President-elect, and 
his task force, who were working on the problems of 
government, including the military and the defense role and 
things. Kennedy personally liked this one aspect very much, 
and he picked it up and showed an intense interest almost 
from the day he was inaugurated. 
So with the Army doing some things, he wanted the other 
services to see what they could do. The Marine Corps said 
they had a very simple solution -- that all of the Marine 
Corps was designed to fight counter-insurgency, so the 
President needn't ask any of the other services to develop 
anything, but to just turn the problem over to the Marine 
Corps and they'd take care of the whole thing for him. The 
President said, "Thank you very much, but I still want the 
services to develop their capabilities." And with that each 
of the Chiefs came back from the presidential meeting to the 
Pentagon and went to work on the problem, one of them 
being LeMay. 
Curt LeMay, as far as I know, was the impetus or the 
initiating point within the Air Force itself for Jungle 
Jim and for coming up with something in response to the 
President's reguest. I know that I talked to him about it 
at the period, and from the way he talked I had always 
taken it for granted that it was his own personal sort of 
child, you might say, in the Air Force and that he was 
intensely interested in seeing it formed and be given a 
chance in life. 
I know in the fall of '61 he was very anxious to get 
units into Vietnam to start working with the Vietnamese 
Air Force, and start training the Vietnamese Air Force. 
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He had asked me when I went out there to get the agreement 
of the Vietnamese Government to invite the U.S. Air Force 
to send in such a unit. This was done, in the fall of '61, 
when Ross Milton (General T . R. Milton) and I went to Vietnam 
with Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow. I obtained the request 
from President Diem and Ross Milton picked out their first 
station, at Bien Hoa Air Base. 
Q: In 1962 -- the United States Air Force scheme for 
keeping paratroops and the troop carrier aircraft on alert 
as a central measure in meeting the insurgency. (Pause) 
A: What was the first part of that? 
Q: Keeping paratroopers and troop carriers 
A: Well, I felt that having an elite group in the sense 
of people trained and screened for skills to meet the type 
of minimum effort for a maximum effect.that the U.S. could 
exert in one of these situations, was a very wise action 
for the U.S. military to take. I wasn't entirely certain 
that just designating airborne units as a group to meet a 
situation would prove a valuable solution or an effective 
solution to it, but having an American unit able to get 
into a position very quickly did make sense to me. 
So I was personally for such an action, although with 
the qualificat ion that they had to be truly skilled in the 
types of actions that would be asked of them. 
I felt then and still do that this was a vital as 
well as a major qualification. 
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Q: To what extent, sir, was the United States Air Force's 
view of counter-insurgency in Southeast Asia clouded by 
preoccupations with modern hardware, air strike roles as 
opposed to air lift -- and I'll come back to these one at 
a time -- the inter-service competition, and our experiences 
in World War II and Korea. 
To get back to the first, were we too involved with 
trying to get the most modern hardware into the theater? 
A: No, not really. The first aircraft being considered 
were actually close to being obsolete as far as what the 
then modern Air Force was considering, and there was 
considerable expression of thought, I know, by some of the 
Air Force generals who were concerned with these matters 
up in the Air Staff, about keeping our equipment to a 
nature of the means that the recipient country could afford 
to have. It meant that aircraft would be either passing 
out of the U.S. inventory, or being less costly to maintain, 
or to man or to equip, or at least to keep flying. 
I know that in the early days there was nowhere near 
the love of gimmickry and advanced ideas and development 
of new weapons and so forth that very shortly after became 
fashionable. 
Q: Do you think we tended to concentrate too much on the 
air strike roles as opposed to, let's say, air lift and psy 
war operations? 
A: Perhaps so. There was one element of the Air Staff 
working on this matter at the time, I know, and they used 
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to talk to me. Mind you, I wasn't a member of the Air 
Staff at the time, but was on the Secretary of Defense's 
Staff. 
But in talking with some of the officers, I recall 
some of their thinking, on examples selected by them from 
past experiences. The one that they mentioned again and 
again was a British experience in what used to be called 
Mesopotamia, in which the RAF allegedly had the major role 
in keeping down dissidents by simple use of air power, by 
both air strikes and threatened air strikes, and air patrols 
by fighters and bombers over dissident-ruled areas. 
Q: That was against the Mad Mullah, wasn't it, or 
something like that? 
A: Yes, yes. 
Q: In the desert. 
A: It's still a moot point among the British as to whether 
the RAF accomplished that, or whether some of the political 
types and some of the ground types who were involved in 
negotiations and other matters didn't have as key a role 
as the RAF. But I knew that in the Air Staff, at the time 
there was strong consideration given by some of the Staff 
to the fact that air power properly used might very well 
offer the major or the key factor in solving an insurgency, 
if given the proper chance. 
Q: What was your reaction to this? 
,. 
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A: I felt that air power had a part in it, but I had 
made it very plain in my talks with the Air Staff people, 
and then some of the early study groups that were trying to 
work on these problems for the President, that I felt that 
a key factor in countering insurgency was to get native 
leaders to the right places at the right times . Thus, the 
main use of air power could be to give airlift to these 
individuals and bringing them from their desk in the capital 
city out to the field, getting them to the proper places 
at the right time. I felt this way not only about air 
power, but also I was in opposition to the ground force 
type of weapon such as artillery against anything that 
wouldn't have a personal contact with the enemy, but might 
be easily subject to misuse. 
Q: Do you think we also leaned upon the experience s of 
World War II and Korea as a guide to our actions, or did 
we sort of try and learn everything all over again from the 
beginning? 
A: Well, there were some World War II experiences that 
were cranked into this, particularly by some of the folks 
who had operated either in the African desert or in the 
Middle East, and those who had been in the China-Burma 
theater, who had been in on the "hump" flights or had 
tried to work air support missions for the Chindits, for 
Merrill's marauders, and other unconventional forces on 
our side operating against the Japanese in Burma. But 
I really am not an authority on what the thinking was inside 
the Air Force and on what was being brought to bear at 
l • 
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that time, since I was a step removed from the Air Staff in my work for the Secretary of Defense, and only used to learn these things through informal sessions with some of the officers involved in my office. 
I was trying to encourage a lot of thinking by the Air Force and the other services on this subject, and was mostly pushing them to rely on very common sense, less flamboyant solutions to some of the problems. 
Q: Sir, could you tell us something about Air Force civic action activities in Vietnam from the early days of your involvement until you ceased to be current with the scene? 
A: I know very little about the early days of Air Force civic action. I don't recall ever discussing the subject with any Air Force officers. I might possibly have from some of those who would have visited me in the Pentagon, but the people who asked me to talk about civic action were the Army and the Marine Corps. I don't recall any such request ever from the Air Force until many, many years later, when I was a civilian in the Embassy in Saigon. Along about 1967 the Air Force civic action people in Vietnam were having a meeting in Saigon and asked me to sit in with them one afternoon, which I did. I was a little surprised then that the Air Force was that interested in the subject, as I had known very little about it before then. 
Q: Sir, on something 180 out from civic action, what were your feelings once we began our bombing campaign in North Vietnam? 
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A: I was initially quite opposed to the bombing, since it 
broke almost every rule that I knew of for success in a 
political war which was being undertaken in Vietnam at the 
time. I expressed myself rather plainly on this at that 
time to some of our top U.S. officials in the Administration, 
by pointing out the advantages -- politically -- that it gave 
an enemy who had been having trouble with the people up to 
that point. As with the Luftwaffe attacks in Britain, it 
permitted Ho Chi Minh and some other smart political leaders 
in Hanoi to do a Winston Churchill and prove that an enemy 
was attacking them and therefore the people must hold 
together and unify and defy this enemy. So, in effect, we 
were doing something that would look good from our rules of 
warfare, but in terms of the actual war that was being conducted 
in Vietnam, we were letting the aggressors and our enemies 
take full political and psychological advantage of something . 
We gave them a very priceless way of maintaining and 
strengthening their leadership at the very time when we 
wanted it weakened. So I think that any move that would 
make leaders strong at the time we are fighting them, 
certainly isn't a very wise move. I don't think that the 
advantage that was talked of at the time -- that we would 
give a boost in morale to the South Vietnamese -- was worth 
the price, and certainly the bomb damage that was wreaked 
on North Vietnam was hardly worth the price to arouse a 
whole nation to oppose us and to actually get the energy 
and the will to want to see our defeat, which was the real 
cost of that attack. 
Q: Now we've entered a period of withdrawal from Vietnam. 
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How do you see in the final scenario the resolution of 
American involvement in Vietnam? 
A: I think that we are going to have a slow erosion of U.S. 
involvement, that is going to have to take place over the 
years, instead of the very brief period now being talked 
about in Congress and in the press and by demonstrators; 
we might well get out of a combat role and stay on in an 
advisory and support role; we might even get out of an air 
combat role and still stay in an air support (role), meaning 
transport role, for a long time, but there will be some sort 
of American presence in Vietnam that will have elements of 
military and economic assistance of some sort for a very 
long period. 
As the Vietnamese awaken to the fact that they have to 
stand on their own feet, and take care of their own problems, 
there will be a very healthy series of growth actions coming 
out of that, in which the more they are forced to do, the 
more they will learn that they can do. They will become 
aware of their own capabilities, and thus able to carry out 
things. 
So I think we might well wind up with more American 
personnel and help in Vietnam than the situation will need, 
say a year or two years from now, if present developments 
continue the way they do, and if the political scene keeps 
developing in Vietnam the way we hope it will. That is, if 
the Vietnamese elections for President and for Congress 
this year are carried out in a way so that the Vietnamese 
people themselves will feel that they have elected a 
leadership that truly represents them, and are people that 
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they want as leaders. Then I think many other factors in 
the war will start changing favorably towards us, and, as 
we pull out troops, we will discover that the Vietnamese 
are demonstrating far more capability in handling their 
own affairs than any of the Americans can really appreciate 
in their sort of projections for the future today. If 
there is cheating and a bad scene in the elections in 
Vietnam this year, I think that in the almost immediate 
future -- say a year or two years from now -- they will 
find tremendous political dissatisfaction on our side in 
Vietnam , and a very good chance that there will be more 
coup attempts or other very unsettling, unstable events 
taking place in Vietnam that can only assist the present 
enemy. This will lead to problems where we should have 
Americans in helping, but the Americans couldn' t help, and 
would not be permitted to by public opinion here at home . 
It will be too strong for a President or for a Congress or 
for any executive department to give aid then, so -- what 
I have just said is really contingent on the political 
factors. They are really the main feature on the horizon 
for the immediate future in Vietnam, far more than the 
actions that took place in Laos or Cambodia, or any of the 
other actions that so much public attention has been on. 
Q: Thank you very much , sir. 
End of Interview. 
